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CANBERRA PLEASE PASS BRISBANE AND PERTH

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- A. ECUADOR/PERU: RIO GUARANTORS DEPLOY OBSERVER  
- MISSION, PARTIES PREPARED TO SETTLE?
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- C. LIBERIA: PEACE PROCESS REGRESSING
- D. UN AND REGIONAL NOTES

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PEACEKEEPING PERSPECTIVES IS A JOURNAL OF INR ANALYSIS OF

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MULTILATERAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND HUMANITARIAN  
AFFAIRS.

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2. FRANCE/AFRICA: THROUGH A TURQUOISE PRISM

IN A WORKING PAPER TO THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT (NOW THE LARGEST UN TROOP CONTRIBUTOR) HAS PROPOSED THAT EUROPE ADOPT A COORDINATED CONFLICT-RESOLUTION AND -PREVENTION POLICY IN AFRICA,

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PERHAPS AS EARLY AS JUNE 1995, TO FOCUS EU MEMBER MONIES ON AFRICAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND ON NATIONS WITH A PROVEN PEACEKEEPING CAPABILITY AND INTEREST. PARIS HOPES THE EU WILL ADOPT ITS PAPER AS POLICY IN PART TO AVOID

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FUTURE COSTLY UNILATERAL MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS SIMILAR TO LAST SUMMER'S "OPERATION TURQUOISES--THE FRENCH-LED MULTINATIONAL MISSION TO CREATE A "SECURITY ZONE" IN SOUTHWESTERN RWANDA. THE FRENCH PAPER PROPOSES THAT EU MEMBERS FACILITATE THE MOBILIZATION BOTH OF INDIGENOUS AFRICAN CONFLICT-RESOLUTION CAPABILITIES, PARTICULARLY WITHIN THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU), AND OF THE MEANS TO CONDUCT PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS. UNDER "CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES," PRANCE ARGUES, EUROPEAN STATES, IN COOPERATION WITH AFRICAN REGIONAL POWERS, CAN TAKE PART IN AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING AND HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS.

FRENCH DEFENSE MINISTRY ANALYSIS OF OPERATION TURQUOISE, SEARED WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, SUGGESTS THAT ANY FUTURE FRENCH-LED AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING OR HUMANITARIAN OPERATION WOULD BE AUTHORIZED TO USE "ALL MEANS NECESSARY" TO CONDUCT ITS MISSION. THE RELATIVE SUCCESS OF THE RWANDAN MISSION HAS REINFORCED THE FRENCH BELIEF THAT THE APPLICATION OF DECISIVE AND SWIFT FORCE COMBINED WITH A CLEAR "EXIT STRATEGY" WOULD PROTECT FRENCH SOLDIERS AND HELP THEM FULFILL MISSION GOALS ON TIME AND WITH MINIMAL CASUALTIES.

WHAT PARIS LEARNED

ACCORDING TO A FRENCH MEMBER OF THE TURQUOISE COMMAND, THE DEFENSE MINISTRY PLANNED TURQUOISE AS A COMBAT OPERATION WITH A HUMANITARIAN GOAL. THE COMBINED ASSETS OF THE FRENCH-LED MISSION, LED BY BRIG. GEN. JEAN-CLAUDE LAFOURCADE, WERE FORMED INTO RELATIVELY AUTONOMOUS UNITS

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DESIGNED TO TAKE COORDINATED ACTIONS ON MULTIPLE FRONTS WHILE THEY RETAINED THE ABILITY TO REGROUP QUICKLY TO DEFEAT A CONCENTRATED BELLIGERENT FORCE. FROM AN INITIAL STRENGTH OF 800 TROOPS OPERATING FROM GOMA AND 450 IN BUKAVU, ZAIRE, TURQUOISE ULTIMATELY INCLUDED 2,500 SOLDIERS, 500 VEHICLES, AND 40 FIXED- AND ROTARY-WINGED AIRCRAFT. A SINGLE ARMORED COMPANY HAS EQUIPPED WITH 12 LIGHT-ARMORED VEHICLES.

THE FRENCH BELIEVE THAT THEIR APPROACH PROVIDES SEVERAL "GENERAL LESSONS" THAT CAN BE APPLIED TO FUTURE PEACEKEEPING OR MORE AGGRESSIVE HUMANITARIAN MISSIONS MANDATED TO ESTABLISH SECURITY ZONES OR "SAFE AREAS." IN A REPORT TO THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT FROM THE DEFENSE MINISTRY, MEMBERS OF THE TURQUOISE COMMAND STRESS THE FOLLOWING KEY POINTS:

ESTABLISH CONTROL. THE INITIAL SUCCESS OF ANY MISSION REQUIRES THAT THE INTERNATIONAL FORCE ATTACK ALL CENTERS OF OUTLAW AUTHORITY TO GAIN CONTROL OVER ARMED ELEMENTS (IN THIS CASE, BELLIGERENT HUTU AND TUTSI COMBATANTS), AND CONFISCATE CREW-SERVED WEAPONS AND ARMORED VEHICLES. AS THE PEACEKEEPING FORCE DEPLOYS, THE BELLIGERENTS ALSO MUST NOT BE PERMITTED TO STOP OR BLUFF THE FORCE, PREVENTING A PRECEDENT OF BELLIGERENT AUTHORITY OVER THE INTERNATIONAL MISSION.

THE FRENCH-LED MISSION DEPLOYED TWO TASK FORCES THROUGH SOUTHWESTERN RWANDA TO ESTABLISH A "SECURITY ZONE" AND PROTECT THREATENED CIVILIANS. ALTHOUGH ARMORED VEHICLES AND CREW-SERVED WEAPONS (FOR EXAMPLE, HEAVY MORTARS AND

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ARTILLERY PIECES) WERE FEW IN NUMBER, THEY POSED A THREAT TO THE LIGHTLY ARMORED FRENCH FORCES. FORMER RWANDAN GOVERNMENT ARMY (EX-FAR) SOLDIERS AND RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF) PERSONNEL WERE DISARMED AS THEY ENTERED THE

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FRENCH-CONTROLLED ZONE.

USE ALL MEANS TO SECURE THE ZONE. CLEAR MILITARY COMMANDS AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT MADE IT EASIER FOR FRENCH-LED FORCES TO UNDERSTAND UNIT OBJECTIVES AND COMPLETE MISSION GOALS. FRENCH FORCES WERE PERMITTED TO USE "ALL MEANS NECESSARY" TO MAINTAIN THE SECURITY ZONE AND ALLOW HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS TO OPERATE FREELY. FRENCH UNITS WERE PERMITTED TO USE SMALL ARMS AND MORTARS TO FIRE ON BELLIGERENTS TO PROTECT HUTU AND TUTSI CIVILIANS, AND TO FIRE IN SELF-DEFENSE BEFORE BEING FIRED ON.

CREATE A "PRESENCE" AND ASSERT DOMINANCE. THE FORCE ESTABLISHED A LARGE ENOUGH PRESENCE TO CREATE A SENSE OF AUTHORITY AND SECURITY THROUGHOUT ITS ZONES OF DEPLOYMENT, HELPING IN TURN TO PREVENT THE RETURN OF BELLIGERENTS. A CRITICAL ELEMENT WAS THAT SOLDIERS GAINED AND MAINTAINED THE THREATENED POPULATION'S TRUST AND CONFIDENCE.

FRENCH FORCES IN RWANDA DUG, BUT DID NOT OCCUPY, BUNKERED FIGHTING POSITIONS TO BE USED AS DEFENSIVE POSITIONS OF

LAST RESORT. ALTHOUGH FIGHTING POSITIONS SERVE A MILITARY PURPOSE, THEY ALSO HAVE HIGH POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE SYMBOLIC VALUE. ON THE ONE HAND, THEY  
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DEMONSTRATE TO CIVILIANS A WILLINGNESS BY THE FORCE TO STAND AND PROTECT ITSELF AND CIVILIANS AGAINST ATTACK. ON THE OTHER HAND, BECAUSE SOLDIERS IN BUNKERS ARE IMMOBILE AND VULNERABLE TO HOSTILE FORCES, CIVILIANS ARE LIKELY TO JUDGE FORCES THAT REGULARLY OCCUPY BUNKERS AS WEAK AND ALOOF, PERCEPTIONS THAT UNDERMINE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE.

TRAIN FOR MANY MISSIONS. HUMANITARIAN AND PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS ARE COMPLEX, REQUIRING DIVERSE SOLDIER TRAINING, DISCIPLINE, AND ADVANCED COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES. ALL HUMANITARIAN OR PEACEKEEPING UNITS MUST BE PREPARED TO CONDUCT MINE

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CLEARING, DISARMAMENT, AND CROWD CONTROL AND POLICE OPERATIONS. SPECIAL UNITS SHOULD BE DEPLOYED TO TRAIN AND MONITOR INDIGENOUS POLICE WHILE MILITARY UNITS ESTABLISH A CONTIGUOUS PRESENCE IN THE MISSION AREA, THUS PREVENTING BELLIGERENTS FROM MOVING INTO AREAS THAT FORCES PREVIOUSLY HAD "CLEARED." ONLY HIGHLY DISCIPLINED AND SEASONED TROOPS CAN WORK IN CONDITIONS THAT REFLECT THE "HORRORS OF GENOCIDE AND EPIDEMICS WHICH MIGHT DEMORALIZE LESS EXPERIENCED TROOPS.

DEPLOY DEEP. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES WERE DEPLOYED "DEEP" INTO RWANDA TO SAFEGUARD CIVILIANS WHOM INTELLIGENCE SOURCES REPORTED WERE THREATENED. A CLOSE WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CIVILIAN POPULACE ENCOURAGED CIVILIANS TO COMMUNICATE THEIR CONCERNS FOR THE SAFETY OF THREATENED CIVILIANS IN THE AREA, AND TO DISCLOSE LOCATIONS OF BELLIGERENT FORCES. TROOPS IN "DEEP" DEPLOYMENT OPERATIONS, HOWEVER, FACE A GREATER

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RISK OF CAPTURE, DEATH, OR ISOLATION. RWANDAN VICE PRESIDENT KAGAME IN DECEMBER 1994 SAID 18 FRENCH SOLDIERS WERE CAPTURED IN THE KIBUYE REGION SHORTLY BEFORE TURQUOISE, BUT LATER WERE RELEASED.

WORK WITH THE MEDIA. FRENCH OFFICIALS BELIEVE THAT THE POSITIVE DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL MEDIA DEPICTION OF OPERATION TURQUOISE'S MISSION WAS A CRITICAL FACTOR IN SUSTAINING FRENCH DOMESTIC SUPPORT FOR THE OPERATION AND IN GIVING IT TIME TO ACHIEVE MILITARY SUCCESS. DEFENSE DEPARTMENT PLANNERS WORKED HARD TO AVOID AN ADVERSARIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PRESS. MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES WERE FLOWN INTO ZAIRE TO REPORT ON THE FRENCH BUILDUP AND OTHER PREPARATIONS, BUT ACCESS TO THE CONFLICT AREAS WAS CLOSELY MONITORED. LAFOURCADE CALCULATED THAT

"REASONABLE" OBSTRUCTION OF THE MEDIA, WHICH WOULD ALLOW ACCESS TO SELECTED STORIES, WOULD BE TOLERATED BY THE FRENCH PUBLIC.

THE OPERATION'S INABILITY TO CONTROL LOCAL PRO-TUTSI OR PRO-HUTU BROADCAST (E.G., MOBILE RADIO TRANSMITTERS) AND

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WRITTEN MEDIA DID HANDICAP THE MISSION. FRENCH TROOPS DID NOT PURSUE THE SOURCES OF CLANDESTINE, AND OFTEN HOSTILE, INCENDIARY BROADCASTS SYSTEMATICALLY, RESULTING IN AN INCREASING NUMBER OF DEATHS AND HINDERING THE RETURN OF REFUGEES TO VILLAGES IN RWANDA. IN FUTURE DEPLOYMENTS, FRENCH FORCES PROBABLY WOULD BE ORDERED IMMEDIATELY TO JAM OR TRACK AND DESTROY ANY MEDIA SITES THAT BROADCAST DISINFORMATION.

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REBUILD LOCAL INFRASTRUCTURE. FRENCH MILITARY CIVIL AFFAIRS LIAISON TEAMS, MADE UP OF FRENCH SOLDIERS WITH LOGISTICAL TRAINING, WERE ESSENTIAL FOR COORDINATING NONGOVERNMENTAL AND OTHER HUMANITARIAN EFFORTS WITH LAFOURCADE. CIVIL AFFAIRS UNITS REBUILT INFRASTRUCTURE IN RWANDAN TOWNS AND REFUGEE CAMPS TO PROVIDE ELECTRICITY, POTABLE WATER, AND SANITATION-KEY TO GAINING THE TRUST OF DISPLACED PERSONS AND REFUGEES BY HELPING HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS PERFORM THEIR MISSIONS.

FRENCH DEPLOYMENTS IN AFRICA: THE OUTLOOK

ALTHOUGH FRANCE'S AFRICA POLICY PROBABLY WILL BE REVIEWED FOLLOWING MAY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT IS LIKELY TO REDUCE UNILATERAL FRENCH MILITARY INTERVENTION IN AFRICA, IN PART FOR FINANCIAL REASONS, HOPING TO COORDINATE A EUROPE-WIDE APPROACH TO AFRICAN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN ITS PLACE. PARIS WILL CONTINUE, HOWEVER, TO DEPLOY MILITARY FORCES TO PROTECT FRENCH NATIONALS OR STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN AFRICA, ALTHOUGH PERHAPS NOT AT THE LEVEL OF OPERATION TURQUOISE.

THE LESSONS FRANCE DRAWS FROM OPERATION TURQUOISE HAVE RELEVANCE FOR FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS WORLDWIDE. FRENCH BEHAVIOR IN RWANDA STANDS IN STARK CONTRAST TO THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT ELSEWHERE. FOR EXAMPLE, UNDER UN COMMAND FRANCE'S MORE THAN 4,500 TROOPS DEPLOYED WITH THE UN PROTECTION FORCE (UNPROFOR) IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA OFTEN DEFEND STATIC POSITIONS, ARE TAKEN HOSTAGE BY THE OPPOSING PARTIES, AND-LIKE OTHER UN FORCES THERE-ARE BOTH DESPISED AND WELCOMED BY

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CIVILIANS. THIRTY-ONE FRENCH SOLDIERS HAVE DIED SERVING UNPROFOR SINCE 1992.

AS THE LARGEST TROOP CONTRIBUTOR TO UN OPERATIONS, FRANCE HOPES TO REDUCE THE THREAT TO ITS TROOPS BY CONDUCTING ASSERTIVE, SHORT-TERM, AND INTENSIVE PEACEKEEPING OR HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS. PARIS WILL RESIST PARTICIPATING IN UN OPERATIONS IN AREAS OUTSIDE EUROPE WITHOUT A PROMISED END DATE OR CLEAR DEFINITION OF MISSION OBJECTIVES. FRENCH TROOPS CAN BE EXPECTED TO AVOID FIXED POSITIONS, TO CONDUCT MORE PRO-ACTIVE AND AGGRESSIVE OPERATIONS EARLY IN A MISSION TO ESTABLISH AN UNBENDING AUTHORITY, AND TO MONITOR THE MEDIA REACTION IN HOPES OF AVOIDING COSTLY AND RESOURCE-INTENSIVE MISSIONS.

FRANCE'S CULTURAL, LINGUISTIC, AND EXPATRIATE TIES TO FRANCOPHONE AFRICAN NATIONS WILL GUARANTEE A CONTINUING, IF SOMETIMES UNEASY, RELATIONSHIP WITH AFRICA, ESPECIALLY WITH ITS FORMER COLONIES. FRENCH MILITARY FORCES CAN BE EXPECTED TO DEPLOY IN THE REGION WITH GREATER MILITARY CAPABILITY THAN UK, GERMAN, ITALIAN, OR NORDIC CONTINGENTS AND WITH BROADER RULES OF ENGAGEMENT.

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN FRANCE, AS WELL AS TROOP COMMITMENTS ELSEWHERE, HOWEVER, ARGUE AGAINST FUTURE MAJOR UNILATERAL FRENCH OPERATIONS IN AFRICA. PRANCE HOPES THAT IT CAN COORDINATE AND COMMAND FUTURE EU DEPLOYMENTS TO AFRICA, SHARING THE FINANCIAL AND MILITARY BURDEN. FRANCE, AND OTHER EU MEMBERS, HOWEVER, WILL DEPEND ON FOREIGN-OWNED HEAVY-LIFT ASSETS-INCLUDING THOSE OF THE US, RUSSIA, AND THE UKRAINE-QUICKLY TO DEPLOY TROOPS AND MATERIEL TO MISSION AREAS. (DAVID MCKEE,

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OPERATION TURQUOISE

FRENCH AIRBORNE AND MARINE INFANTRY FORCES ENTERED SOUTHWEST RWANDA FROM STAGING AREAS IN EASTERN ZAIRE ON JUNE 23, 1994, TO ACCOMPLISH WHAT THE EXPANDED UN ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA (UNAMIR) HAD FAILED TO DO: PROVIDE PROTECTION TO THREATENED CIVILIAN POPULATIONS AND FACILITATE RELIEF EFFORTS TO MORE THAN HALF A MILLION DISPLACED RWANDAN HUTUS. [SEE NOTE.]

AFRICAN NATIONS, INCLUDING SENEGAL AND CHAD, DEPLOYED MORE THAN 500 TROOPS TO THE MORE THAN 2,000-MAN FRENCH-LED OPERATION. MISSION LEADER BRIG. GEN. JEAN-CLAUDE LAFOURCADE, DEPUTY COMMANDER OF THE LLTH AIRBORNE DIVISION, COMMANDED THE RELATIVELY WELL EQUIPPED AND MOBILE HUMANITARIAN FORCE PREPARED TO DEFEND ITSELF AND CIVILIANS AGAINST LIGHTLY ARMED POTENTIAL BELLIGERENTS, IN A ROUGHLY 3,400-SQUARE-KILOMETER AREA.

[NOTE = UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 929 ON JUNE 22 AUTHORIZED THE FRENCH MISSION, UNDER UN CHAPTER VII, TO DEPLOY PEACEKEEPERS TO RWANDA "UNTIL UNAMIR IS BROUGHT UP TO THE NECESSARY STRENGTH," BUT NOT MORE THAN TWO MONTHS. RESOLUTIONS 918 OF MAY 17 AND 925 OF JUNE 8 APPROVED EXPANSION OF UNAMIR FROM 450 TO 5,500 TROOPS WITH A BROADER HUMANITARIAN MANDATE.]

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